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Psychophysics and the judgment of price: Judging complex objects
on a non-physical dimension elicits sequential effects like those in
perceptual tasks
William J. Matthews and Neil Stewart∗
Abstract
When participants in psychophysical experiments are asked to estimate or identify stimuli which differ on a single
physical dimension, their judgments are influenced by the local experimental context — the item presented and judgment
made on the previous trial. It has been suggested that similar sequential effects occur in more naturalistic, real-world
judgments. In three experiments we asked participants to judge the prices of a sequence of items. In Experiment 1,
judgments were biased towards the previous response (assimilation) but away from the true value of the previous item
(contrast), a pattern which matches that found in psychophysical research. In Experiments 2A and 2B, we manipu-
lated the provision of feedback and the expertise of the participants, and found that feedback reduced the effect of the
previous judgment and shifted the effect of the previous item’s true price from contrast to assimilation. Finally, in all
three experiments we found that judgments were biased towards the centre of the range, a phenomenon known as the
“regression effect” in psychophysics. These results suggest that the most recently-presented item is a point of reference
for the current judgment. The findings inform our understanding of the judgment process, constrain the explanations for
local context effects put forward by psychophysicists, and carry practical importance for real-world situations in which
contextual bias may degrade the accuracy of judgments.
Keywords: sequential effects; magnitude estimation; price; anchoring
1 Introduction
When people make basic perceptual judgments — about
the brightness of a light or the loudness of a tone, for
example — their responses are greatly influenced by the
context in which the stimuli are presented: A square of a
given size is regarded as large when most of the squares
in the experiment are of smaller size, but regarded as
small when most of the squares are larger (e.g., Parducci,
1965). It has long been known that this insight from psy-
chophysics has relevance to more complex, “real world”
situations. Thus, the perceived severity of a moral trans-
gression depends upon the ensemble of scenarios pre-
sented for judgment, even when participants are explic-
itly instructed to ignore this context (Parducci, 1968).
Psychophysical studies have therefore demonstrated
the importance of what may be termed the global experi-
mental context — the set of stimuli employed — in deter-
mining perceptual judgments, and this insight has proven
useful in more complex and naturalistic judgment tasks.
Yet psychophysical judgments are also influenced by lo-
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cal context — by the stimuli presented on the past few
trials — and a number of authors have provided evidence
that the same principal applies to more complex, non-
perceptual decisions too (e.g., Beckstead, 2008; Vlaev &
Chater, 2007). The current article develops this idea by
studying sequential effects in a complex judgment task
using the analytical tools and experimental manipulations
employed in psychophysical research.
The dependency of perceptual judgments on the events
of the last few trials has been extensively researched by
psychophysicists. The typical approach is to employ a
regression model in which the current judgment, Jn ,
is the dependent variable and the current stimulus and
stimuli and/or responses from trials earlier in the se-
quence are predictors. In particular, Jesteadt, Luce, and
Green (1977) advocated the use of the following regres-
sion model:
Jn = γ + α0Pn + α1Pn−1 + β1Jn−1 + ² (1)
where Pn is the value of the stimulus presented on the
current trial, Pn−1 is the value of the stimulus on the pre-
vious trial, and Jn−1 is the value of the judgment made
on the previous trial. Equation 1 has been applied to data
from a large number of psychophysical experiments. In
these experiments, the participant is presented with a se-
quence of stimuli which differ in one physical attribute,
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such as tones which differ in loudness, and asked to form
some judgment of that attribute; the precise nature of the
judgment depends on the psychophysical task. In mag-
nitude estimation experiments, the participant is asked
to assign a number which indicates his or her subjective
impression of the loudness of each tone, either with re-
spect to an explicit standard (e.g., Reynolds & Stevens,
1960) or on an absolute scale (e.g., Ward, 1987). In
cross-modality matching experiments, the participant is
asked to adjust the magnitude of one dimension, such as
loudness, so that it matches a magnitude on another di-
mension, such as brightness (e.g., Ward, 1979). In cat-
egory judgment experiments, the participant is asked to
put each stimulus into one of several categories (such
as “very quiet,” “quiet,” “medium,” “loud,” “very loud”;
e.g., Petzold & Haubensak, 2001). In absolute identifi-
cation experiments, each stimulus is given a unique label
— for example, the stimuli are numbered 1–10 — and
the participant is asked to name the stimulus presented
on each trial (e.g., Garner, 1953).
Equation 1 has been used to study sequential effects in
all of these paradigms. The details of the results depend
somewhat on the experimental task but the general pat-
tern is robust: The response on the current trial is biased
towards the judgment made on the previous trial but away
from the stimulus presented on that trial (e.g., DeCarlo &
Cross, 1990; Jesteadt et al., 1977; Matthews & Stewart,
in press; Mori, 1998; Mori & Ward, 1995; Ward, 1979;
1987). That is, there is assimilation to the immediately
preceding response but contrast to the immediately pre-
ceding stimulus.
These sequential effects have been given various in-
terpretations, many of which assume that there is some
kind of perceptual interference from the previous stimu-
lus and that the previous item and the judgment assigned
to it serve as a point of reference when evaluating the
current stimulus (e.g., DeCarlo & Cross, 1990). It is ar-
gued that even when participants are asked to judge stim-
uli with respect to long-term referents, they use the most
recently experienced events as a framework for judgment
(Holland & Lockhead, 1968; Laming, 1984; Stewart, G.
D. A. Brown, & Chater, 2005).
Many real-world tasks have a structural similarity to
magnitude estimation or category judgment, in that peo-
ple esimate or classify a sequence of stimuli. However,
the stimuli are very different. The tones, lights and lines
used in psychophysical investigations are very simple and
notoriously difficult to store in long-term memory; in-
deed, it is frequently asserted that our capacity for pro-
cessing such stimuli is limited to about 7 items (Miller,
1956), in contrast to our capacity to recognise and iden-
tify many thousands of complex objects (e.g., Matthews,
Benjamin, & Osborne, 2007). The labile mental repre-
sentations of psychophysical stimuli may be responsible
for the observed sequential effects; the inability to form
accurate long-term representations may push people to-
wards the use of recent items as a frame of reference.
When people make real-world judgments about complex
items, and when the judgments are of a type with which
they are very familiar, it may be that the sequential effects
are eliminated as people use only long-term referents and
stable internal scales of judgment. Indeed, many of the
models of sequential effects in psychophysical judgment
make assumptions which explicitly concern perceptual
tasks and which are not readily extended to other situa-
tions (e.g., S. D. Brown, Marley, Donkin, & Heathcote,
2008).
The current article asks whether the pattern of se-
quential dependencies seen in psychophysical tasks ex-
tends to situations in which people make judgments about
non-physical dimensions of complex, real-world objects.
In three experiments we asked participants to judge the
prices of various items. We chose this task because it
corresponds reasonably well to an important aspect of our
economic lives; we are routinely exposed to sequences of
products and, implicitly or explicitly, assess their proba-
ble cost. This task was also attractive because it allowed
us to use rich, complex stimuli and to require judgments
about a property that does not correspond to a simple
physical aspect of the item presented for judgment.
In Experiment 1, we ask whether judgments of price
exhibit sequential dependencies of the type seen in psy-
chophysical experiments. In Experiments 2A and 2B we
extend the results of Experiment 1 to new stimuli and a
modified procedure, and ask whether experimental ma-
nipulations known to influence sequential dependencies
in psychophysical tasks exert the same effects on judg-
ments of price.
2 Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 participants judged the prices of chairs.
We chose chairs as the to-be-judged items because we felt
their prices should be relatively obvious from their ap-
pearance (unlike, say, electronic goods, which may have
many hidden features). We presented pictures of chairs
taken from the website of a popular retailer (Ikea). One
can browse this website and purchase chairs based en-
tirely upon their photographs.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
Twenty five staff and students from the University of War-
wick took part; each was paid £3. All participants had
been resident in the UK for at least the past 3 years.
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Figure 1: Distribution of prices of stimuli in Experiment
1 (left) and Experiments 2A and 2B (right).
2.1.2 Stimuli
The stimuli were 100 pictures of chairs available from the
Ikea furniture store. The prices of the chairs ranged from
£6.49 to £489 (M = 95.49, SD = 98.86); the distribu-
tion of prices is shown in Figure 1. Each picture mea-
sured 500x500 pixels and was presented on a 19” TFT
monitor with resolution 1280x1024 pixels, viewed from
approximately 50cm.
2.1.3 Procedure
Participants were tested in individual testing cubicles. On
each trial, participants were shown one of the chairs. Un-
derneath the photo was a box in which the participant
typed his or her estimate of the price; participants were
asked to enter the price in pounds and were free to use
the decimal point if they wished. Participants were free
to edit their responses (e.g., by deleting the number) and
entered their judgment by pressing Enter or Return. The
screen then went blank for 500 ms before the presenta-
tion of the next chair. Participants were told not to worry
if they were uncertain and just to enter their best estimate
of each item’s price. Each participant judged each item
once, giving 100 trials per participant; the order of pre-
sentation was randomized for each person.
2.2 Results
In this experiment, and in those which follow, there were
a small number of missing/nonsensical responses (e.g.,
“£0”) and cases where, after completing the experiment,
the participant reported having mis-typed a particular
judgment. Such responses were excluded from the analy-
sis, as were a handful of extremely large responses (more
than five inter-quartile ranges above the upper quartile for
that participant) which were assumed to have been en-
tered in error. In the current experiment a total of 0.12%
of responses were excluded.
2.2.1 Relationship between true price and judged
price
We began by plotting the relationship between judged
price and true price separately for each participant. The
top panel of Figure 2 shows the results averaged over par-
ticipants; each point represents the average judgment for
a given product.
Judged price increases with true price. However, the
distribution of true prices is highly skewed; there are a
large number of low-priced products and fewer expensive
items (see e.g., Stewart & Simpson, 2007, for other exam-
ples of this in price data), giving very high leverage to a
relatively small number of expensive items. In addition,
there is evidence of a curvilinear relationship between
price and judgment, with the curve becoming flatter at
higher prices (this pattern was more obvious in individ-
ual participant data). We therefore applied a logarithmic
transformation to both the true price and judgment val-
ues. The results, averaged over participants, are shown in
the bottom panel of Figure 2. The transformation brought
the data into better agreement with the assumptions of lin-
ear regression, so for all subsequent analyses we used the
log-transformed data.
To investigate the relationship between price and judg-
ment, we regressed judged prices on true prices. The re-
gression line for the participant-averaged data is shown
in the bottom of Figure 2, along with a line of zero inter-
cept and slope of one that indicates the results expected if
judgments were perfectly accurate — the “veridical” line.
The regression line is swivelled with respect to the veridi-
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Figure 2: Relationship between true price and judged
price in Experiment 1. The plots show the mean judgment
for each product. The top panel shows the untransformed
data; the bottom panel shows the results after logarithmi-
cally transforming both the true prices and the judgments.
The solid line in the bottom panel is the regression line,
indicating the empirical relationship between true price
and judgment. The dashed line shows the results expected
if judgments were perfectly accurate.
cal line; on average, participants overestimated the price
of cheap items and underestimated the price of expensive
items.
We applied the same approach to the data from each
individual participant. There was a significant positive re-
lationship between true price and judged price for every
participant but, as seen in the averaged data, the regres-
sion lines were rotated towards the horizontal. We return
to this point later.
2.2.2 Sequential Effects
To examine sequential effects we applied Equation 1; that
is, we regressed the judgment on the nth trial, Jn, on the
true price of the nth item, Pn, the true price of the pre-
vious item, Pn−1, and the judgment made for the previ-
ous item, Jn−1 (in all cases using log-transformed vari-
ables). We fit the data from each participant separately.
The results are shown in Table 1. The leftmost columns
of Table 1 contain the unstandardized regression coeffi-
cients along with associated significance codes. Some
researchers (e.g., Beckstead, 2007) have pointed out that
the significance of a regression coefficient depends criti-
cally upon the number of experimental trials, and that re-
searchers should consider effect sizes when deciding the
importance of a particular judgment cue. The rightmost
column of Table 1 therefore contains the standardized co-
efficients (the significance codes for these are, of course,
the same as for the unstandardized values, and are not
listed in Table 1).
For every participant there is a significant positive re-
lationship between actual price and judged price. There
is also evidence of sequential effects, particularly of the
preceding judgment. For 23 of the 25 participants the co-
efficient for Jn−1 is positive, indicating assimilation to
the previous judgment; for 9 of these 23 participants the
effect is significant. Neither of the participants with neg-
ative Jn−1 coefficients show a significant effect. The ef-
fects of the preceding item’s actual price, Pn−1, are less
consistent; 19 of the 25 participants have a negative coef-
ficient, two of which are significant. None of the partici-
pants with a positive coefficient show a significant effect.
There is some multicollinearity in the regression model
because the Jn−1 and Pn−1 predictors are correlated.
Multicollinearity increases the standard errors of the re-
gression coefficients (although the coefficients remain
unbiased estimators), reducing the likelihood that a par-
ticular coefficient will be significant. We examined the
variance inflation factor (VIF) to assess the severity of
the multicollinearity. We calculated the VIFs for the re-
gression analyses from each participant in each experi-
ment (a total of 81 regressions). Each regression had
three independent variables, giving a total of 243 VIF
values. The results indicated that the multicollinear-
ity was not severe; only 2 of the VIFs were more than
3.0 (and then only slightly, 3.01 and 3.03). Some text-
books have suggested that VIFs less than 10.0 indicate
acceptable multicollinearity (e.g., Neter, Kutner, Nacht-
sheim, & Wasserman, 1996). Nonetheless, some cau-
tion is needed when interpreting the significance of re-
sults for individual participants, and in order to estab-
lish the overall pattern, we used a one-sample t-test to
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Table 1: Regression coefficients for Experiment 1.
Unstandardized Standardized
Participant int logPn logPn−1 log Jn−1 logPn logPn−1 log Jn−1 R2
1 0.676 0.653a −0.035 0.137 0.736 −0.039 0.137 0.540
2 2.131a 0.444a −0.188b 0.200d 0.764 −0.324 0.203 0.626
3 0.928c 0.505a −0.041 0.235d 0.713 −0.057 0.240 0.521
4 0.582d 0.462a −0.026 0.221d 0.692 −0.039 0.224 0.524
5 0.864c 0.432a −0.105 0.338b 0.704 −0.172 0.341 0.561
6 0.977c 0.636a −0.066 0.118 0.758 −0.079 0.118 0.566
7 1.807a 0.575a 0.074 0.037 0.735 0.094 0.037 0.557
8 1.408a 0.452a −0.037 0.032 0.760 −0.063 0.032 0.587
9 −0.484 0.732a 0.051 0.161 0.796 0.055 0.161 0.651
10 0.448 0.652a −0.040 0.044 0.790 −0.048 0.043 0.632
11 1.219c 0.435a 0.129 0.121 0.541 0.163 0.122 0.363
12 1.950a 0.351a −0.032 0.175 0.605 −0.055 0.176 0.373
13 0.725d 0.546a −0.017 0.107 0.677 −0.020 0.109 0.480
14 2.979a 0.311a 0.080 −0.168 0.634 0.163 −0.168 0.409
15 2.187a 0.563a −0.055 0.032 0.668 −0.065 0.032 0.453
16 1.032c 0.455a −0.174c 0.475a 0.685 −0.261 0.478 0.627
17 0.599 0.542a −0.111 0.306c 0.704 −0.143 0.308 0.573
18 1.768a 0.608a −0.046 0.088 0.666 −0.050 0.094 0.454
19 −0.017 0.694a −0.023 0.363a 0.819 −0.027 0.369 0.677
20 0.183 0.491a 0.031 0.319b 0.615 0.039 0.321 0.512
21 2.287a 0.207a −0.040 0.147 0.587 −0.112 0.155 0.351
22 1.404a 0.354a −0.102 0.342b 0.668 −0.194 0.346 0.528
23 1.066c 0.585a 0.009 −0.061 0.717 0.011 −0.061 0.532
24 0.751d 0.604a −0.052 0.138 0.782 −0.068 0.138 0.607
25 0.741d 0.521a −0.025 0.179 0.722 −0.035 0.185 0.506
M 1.128 0.512 −0.034 0.163 0.702 −0.053 0.166 0.528
SD 0.797 0.126 0.072 0.143 0.069 0.113 0.145 0.090
a p <.0001, b p < .001, c p < .01, d p < .05
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 4, No. 1, February 2008 Judgments of price 69
Table 2: Mean R2 changes for each coefficient.
Pn Pn−1 Jn−1
Pn−1+
Jn−1
Experiment 1 0.491 0.013 0.024 0.037
Experiment 2A
(No feedback) 0.416 0.011 0.028 0.039
Experiment 2B
(Feedback) 0.493 0.026 0.010 0.036
Note: predictors were log-transformed in Experiment 1.
see whether the mean of the (unstandardized) regression
coefficients collected from the 25 subjects reliably dif-
fered from zero (Lorch & Myers, 1990; see e.g., Ward,
1985; 1987; 1990). For all three predictors (Pn, Pn−1,
and Jn−1) the mean coefficients were significantly differ-
ent from zero. As one would expect, the Pn coefficient
was positive, t(24) = 20.4, p < .001. The Pn−1 coef-
ficient was negative, t(24) = 2.33, p = .029, indicating
contrast to the true price of the preceding item. Lastly, the
Jn−1 coefficient was positive, t(24) = 5.70, p < .001,
indicating that the current judgment assimilates towards
the previous judgment.
We conducted hierarchical regression, entering the pre-
dictors in the order Pn, Pn−1, Jn−1, to establish the R2
increases for each (see Mori & Ward, 1995; Ward, 1979;
1987, for a similar approach). The mean R2 values (aver-
aged over participants) are shown in Table 2. The propor-
tion of variance attributable to events from the previous
trial is not huge, but is comparable to the results from
some psychophysical studies. For example, the “high in-
formation” condition of Ward’s (1979) magnitude esti-
mation experiment produced a total R2 change for the
events of the preceding trial of .019.
2.2.3 Second order effects
Studies of perceptual judgment have found that the cor-
relation between successive judgments depends upon the
size of the difference between successive stimuli. When
Pn and Pn−1 are similar, Jn and Jn−1 are highly corre-
lated; as Pn and Pn−1 move further apart, the correlation
between responses drops away to zero (e.g., Baird, Green,
& Luce, 1980; Jesteadt et al., 1977; Ward, 1979; 1982;
1985). Looking for such second order dependencies in
our data is problematic because of the small number of
trials. Nonetheless, we conducted an exploratory analy-
sis.
The approach we took was based upon that used by
Jesteadt et al. (1977; see also Ward, 1979) in studies
of magnitude estimation, where the relationship between
stimuli and responses is described by a power law, Jn =
kPκn . Jesteadt et al. developed the following approach
to second order sequential dependencies. First, regress
log Jn on logPn separately for each participant to obtain
values of k and κ. Second, normalize each response by
dividing it by the value expected on the basis of the stim-
ulus and the overall power function parameters. Third,
group the data according to the difference between logPn
and logPn−1 (the jump size). Finally, for each jump
size, compute the relationship between the current (nor-
malized) response and the previous one, according to the
equation:
log
Jn
kPκn
= δ + β log
Jn−1
kIκn−1
+ ² (2)
We employed the same approach. (Recall that the
skewed distribution of prices in this experiment meant
that we used log-transformed variables, so a straight-
forward implementation of Jesteadt et al.’s (1977) ap-
proach is appropriate.) We had to aggregate across jump
sizes to obtain a useable number of trials in each con-
dition; we placed the values of logPn − logPn−1 into
five bins such that, across the whole experiment, an ap-
proximately equal number of observations fell into each
bin. For each bin size we calculated, separately for each
participant, the correlation between log(Jn/kPκn ) and
log(Jn−1/kPκn−1) . Figure 3 shows the mean correla-
tion coefficients. As one would expect with so few data
points, the correlation coefficients are very noisy, and a
one-way within subjects ANOVA indicated no significant
effect of jump size, F (4, 96) < 1. However, inspection
of the figure suggests slight evidence for the inverted v-
shaped pattern seen in psychophysical studies.
2.2.4 Depth of sequential effects
Finally, we tried fitting a regression model which in-
cluded the events from two trials back as predictors; there
was no evidence for a consistent effect of Pn−2 or Jn−2.
The coefficients were significant for only a handful of
participants (three showed a significant positive effect of
Jn−2; none showed a significant effect of Pn−2) and one
sample t-tests on the mean coefficients revealed no signif-
icant effect of Pn−2 (M = 0.006, SD = 0.068, t(24) <
1) or Jn−2 (M = 0.040, SD = 0.112, t(24) = 1.77,
p = .089). Although these results hint that there might
be an effect of Jn−2 on the current judgment, this was not
borne out in the subsequent experiments.
2.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 may be summarized as fol-
lows. Firstly, participants’ judgments were correlated
with the true prices of the items, but this correlation was
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Figure 3: Effect of jump size on correlation between suc-
cessive responses. Error bars show 95% confidence in-
tervals calculated for a within-subject design (Masson &
Loftus, 2003). Note that in Experiment 1 (top panel), we
used log-transformed price and judgment values; in Ex-
periments 2A and 2B we used raw values.
far from perfect. Secondly, the regression line relating
judgment to true price was rotated towards the horizon-
tal; participant’s judgments were biased towards the cen-
tre of the range. Thirdly, and most importantly, there
were sequential effects; the judgment on the nth trial de-
pended on the events of the previous trial. Specifically,
the current judgment was biased away from the true price
of the previous item but towards the judged price of that
item; this latter effect was particularly pronounced. These
results mimic those found in psychophysical judgments
(e.g., Jesteadt et al., 1977; Mori, 1998; Ward, 1987) and
suggest that, just as for judgments about the physical as-
pects of very simple stimuli, the immediate experimental
context provides an important influence on complex judg-
ments about rich, multidimensional objects.
Experiment 1 has several limitations. The principal
problem is that the observed sequential dependencies are
open to a number of interpretations. It may be that the
assimilation to the previous judgment indicates the use
of that judgment as a point of reference (e.g., Laming,
1995). However, response assimilation might also appear
if participants simply have a tendency to repeat the pre-
vious response or a reluctance to move very far along the
judgment scale, as may occur if they are not fully engaged
with the task. In addition, it is unclear whether the results
of Experiment 1 are specific to the stimuli and procedure
employed in this study.
We therefore conducted two more experiments using
a different class of product (women’s footwear) and a
slightly different experimental procedure. The two new
experiments differed in whether or not the participants
were told the correct value of each product after they had
entered their judgment. In Experiment 2A, no such trial-
by-trial feedback was provided; in Experiment 2B, feed-
back was provided after every judgment. If the sequential
effects found in Experiment 1 arise because the previous
trial serves as a point of reference, the provision of feed-
back should exert a pronounced influence on the form of
these effects. In psychophysical tasks, feedback reduces
the dependency on the previous judgment and increases
the dependency on the preceding stimulus (e.g., Mori &
Ward, 1995; Ward & Lockhead 1971), presumably be-
cause participants now use the true value of the previous
item, rather than their own judgment of it, as a point of
reference (e.g., Stewart et al., 2005). If, on the other hand,
the response assimilation observed in Experiment 1 re-
sults from some non-specific effect, such as a tendency to
repeat responses, the provision of feedback should make
little difference.
As an additional manipulation, we asked whether ex-
pertise influences the form or magnitude of the sequen-
tial dependencies. It seems plausible that participants
who know more about the product being judged will be
less reliant on short-term comparisons and less likely to
show sequential effects; improving information about the
stimulus reduces the sequential dependencies in mag-
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nitude estimation and perceptual identification (Mori,
1998; Ward, 1979). Since the products to be judged were
items of women’s footwear, we examined the issue of ex-
pertise by comparing the results from male and female
participants.
3 Experiment 2A
Whereas in Experiment 1 the item to be judged stayed
on-screen until the participant entered a judgment, Ex-
periment 2A presented each item for a fixed time (3s) and
then provided a fixed window for the participant to enter
his or her judgment (another 3s). The time between suc-
cessive items was therefore fixed, which is potentially im-
portant in judgment tasks (e.g., DeCarlo, 1992; Matthews
& Stewart, in press).
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Twenty eight participants took part, 14 males aged 19-26
years (M = 21.0, SD = 1.9) and 14 females aged 19-22
(M = 20.1, SD = 0.9). All had been resident in the
United Kingdom for at least the past 3 years.
3.1.2 Stimuli
The stimuli were pictures of 110 items of women’s
footwear available from a popular high-street chain (Top-
shop). The prices of the items ranged from £6 to £140
(M = 58.33, SD = 27.27); the distribution of prices is
shown in Figure 1. The pictures were sampled from the
Topshop website. All pictures measured 500x500 pixels
and showed a single item of footwear on a white back-
ground. The stimuli were shown on a 19” TFT monitor
with a resolution of 1280x1024 pixels viewed from ap-
proximately 50cm.
3.1.3 Design and Procedure
On each trial the participant was shown one picture and
asked to judge the price of the item. Each item was shown
for 3s and followed by a 3s window during which the par-
ticipant typed his or her judgment. At the end of the re-
sponse window the screen went blank for 1.5s before pre-
sentation of the next item. Participants completed eight
practice trials followed by three blocks of 34 test trials,
and were allowed to take a short break between blocks.
As the true prices of the items were always integers, par-
ticipants were instructed to enter their judgments to the
nearest pound. The order in which the 110 items were
presented for judgment was randomized for each partici-
pant.
3.2 Results and Discussion
The 8 practice trials were excluded from analysis. Partic-
ipants failed to enter a response within the 3s window on
a small minority of trials (2.2%). A handful of additional
responses (0.28% of the total test trials) were excluded
for the reasons described in Experiment 1.
3.2.1 Relationship between actual price and judged
price
As can be seen in Figure 1, the distribution of prices was
much less skewed than in Experiment 1. (This more even
distribution was fortuitous; the items were sampled at
random from the Topshop website.) The top panel of Fig-
ure 4 plots the mean judgment for each item against the
item’s true price, and indicates a linear relationship be-
tween price and judgment, with errors which do not sys-
tematically vary with price. The results from individual
participants showed the same patterns, and we therefore
used untransformed prices and judgments in the regres-
sion analyses for this experiment.
We regressed judged price on true price for each partic-
ipant. The coefficients were positive for all participants
and significant for all but one. The participant-averaged
data in Figure 4 suggest over-estimation of cheap prod-
ucts and under-estimation of expensive ones. The same
pattern appeared in individual participants’ data.
3.2.2 Sequential Effects
As before, we examined sequential effects by fitting the
regression model described in Equation 1. (The first trial
of each block was omitted from this analysis because the
time since the presentation of the most recent item de-
pended on how long a break the participant took between
blocks.) The regression coefficients for each participant
are shown in Table 3.
For every participant but one there is a significant posi-
tive relationship between true price and judged price. For
the Pn−1 term, 17 coefficients are negative (3 significant)
and 11 are positive (1 significant). For the Jn−1 term,
26 are positive (12 significant) and 2 are negative (neither
significant). One sample t-tests on the coefficients con-
firmed the impression given by the results from individual
participants: There was a significant positive dependence
of judgment on actual price, t(27) = 16.1, p < .001,
a significant negative dependence on the previous item’s
price, t(27) = 2.57, p = .016, and a significant posi-
tive dependence on the previous judgment, t(27) = 6.51,
p < .001.
Unlike Experiment 1, the time between trials was con-
stant in this experiment (with the exception of the self-
paced breaks between blocks), so we can use trial num-
ber as a measure of time and ask whether the observed
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Table 3: Regression coefficients for Experiment 2A (No feedback).
Unstandardized Standardized
Participant int Pn Pn−1 Jn−1 Pn Pn−1 Jn−1 R2
1 8.609 0.507a −0.124 0.179 0.649 −0.152 0.179 0.428
2 13.835d 0.462a 0.025 0.321c 0.570 0.031 0.311 0.430
3 15.665c 0.344a −0.278b 0.465a 0.445 −0.356 0.462 0.378
4 12.132d 0.535a 0.017 0.136 0.699 0.021 0.132 0.525
5 15.936b 0.369a 0.010 0.092 0.624 0.017 0.089 0.402
6 8.956 0.326a −0.034 0.239d 0.624 −0.065 0.236 0.403
7 5.645 0.362a −0.089 0.301c 0.663 −0.162 0.296 0.497
8 11.169d 0.241a −0.099 0.335c 0.438 −0.180 0.336 0.278
9 0.272 0.537a 0.021 0.027 0.766 0.031 0.027 0.595
10 23.845a 0.289a −0.087d 0.082 0.711 −0.214 0.083 0.549
11 5.666 0.505a 0.032 0.118 0.629 0.040 0.121 0.391
12 23.386d 0.341c −0.131 0.034 0.304 −0.121 0.034 0.121
13 73.594a 0.354 −0.339 0.139 0.190 −0.179 0.140 0.071
14 20.624b 0.481a 0.012 −0.025 0.670 0.017 −0.025 0.447
15 12.699d 0.862a −0.120 0.060 0.791 −0.110 0.058 0.635
16 7.017 0.481a 0.008 0.241d 0.721 0.012 0.236 0.624
17 5.544 0.687a −0.127 0.197d 0.767 −0.150 0.197 0.644
18 9.407b 0.196a −0.014 0.113 0.649 −0.048 0.115 0.443
19 −0.134 0.466a 0.122 0.071 0.593 0.154 0.073 0.384
20 10.051c 0.495a 0.001 0.105 0.790 0.002 0.104 0.668
21 9.173 0.323a 0.009 0.250d 0.472 0.013 0.261 0.256
22 0.607 0.384a 0.130d −0.145 0.762 0.246 −0.146 0.575
23 19.059a 0.396a −0.036 0.036 0.832 −0.073 0.035 0.696
24 5.465 0.318a −0.026 0.199d 0.511 −0.041 0.200 0.329
25 14.684a 0.334a −0.046 0.219d 0.647 −0.089 0.238 0.502
26 7.768 0.444a −0.050 0.227d 0.595 −0.067 0.235 0.398
27 10.631d 0.390a −0.140d 0.385a 0.633 −0.227 0.383 0.462
28 8.563 0.667a −0.022 0.123 0.777 −0.025 0.126 0.619
Mean 12.852 0.432 −0.049 0.162 0.626 −0.060 0.162 0.455
SD 13.449 0.142 0.101 0.131 0.150 0.122 0.131 0.155
a p <.0001, b p < .001, c p < .01, d p < .05
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Figure 4: Relationship between true price and judged
price in Experiments 2A and 2B.
response assimilation is due to systematic drift over the
course of the experiment. We repeated the sequential ef-
fects analysis with trial number included as a predictor.
The mean coefficient for the trial number term was not
significant (M = −0.019, SD = 0.075, t(27) = 1.30,
p = .204). There was significant assimilation to Jn−1,
(M = 0.124, SD = 0.138, t(27) = 4.76, p < .001, and
contrast to Pn−1 (M = −0.037, SD = 0.103), although
the latter effect missed significance (t(27) = 1.91, p =
.066). The response assimilation we observed therefore
does not seem due to systematic drift over the session, al-
though such effects are an important direction for study
(Petzold & Haubensak, 2001).
We used independent-samples t-tests to examine
whether participant gender influenced the regression co-
efficients. The results were not significant for any of the
coefficients (for the intercept, t(26) = 1.73, p = .096;
for Pn, t(26) = 1.05, p = .301; for Pn−1, t(26) = 1.44,
p = .163; for Jn−1, t(26) < 1).
We examined second order effects using the approach
described for Experiment 1. The only modification was
that, in keeping with the rest of our analyses for this ex-
periment, we assumed a linear relationship between stim-
ulus price and judgment, Jn = κPn + k. We therefore
examined the correlation between Jn − (κPn + k) and
Jn−1 − (κPn−1 + k). Similarly, we used Pn − Pn−1
(rather than logPn−logPn−1) as a measure of jump size.
The results are shown in the middle of Figure 3. The in-
verted v-shape seen in psychophysical studies is apparent
and the jump size effect is significant, F (4, 108) = 3.54,
p = .009, η2p = .116.
Finally, we tried a regression model which included
events from two trials back as predictors. There was
no evidence that either predictor influenced the current
judgment: For Pn−2, two of the 28 participants had sig-
nificantly positive coefficients and one had a significant
negative coefficient; for Jn−2, one participant had a sig-
nificant positive coefficient. One sample t-tests on the
mean coefficients similarly revealed no effect of Pn−2
(M = 0.010, SD = 0.120, t(27) < 1) or Jn−2
(M = 0.015, SD = 0.110, t(27) < 1).
4 Experiment 2B
Experiment 2B was virtually identical to Experiment 2A,
except that participants were told the true price of each
item after they entered their judgments. Feedback exerts
a marked effect on perceptual judgments (e.g., Mori &
Ward, 1995), and the effects of feedback on the form of
sequential dependencies illuminates the ways in which
participants use local context to make their judgments
(Stewart et al., 2005).
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
Twenty eight new participants were recruited from the
same population as Experiment 2A. None had partici-
pated in Experiment 2A and all were naive to the pur-
poses of the experiment. Fourteen were males aged 19-25
years (M = 20.8, SD = 1.7) and fourteen were females
aged 18-33 (M = 21.1, SD = 4.2).
4.1.2 Stimuli, Design, and Procedure
The stimuli, design and procedure were identical to Ex-
periment 2A, except that each item’s true price was
shown for the first 750-ms of the interval between the end
of the response window and the presentation of the next
item.
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4.2 Results and Discussion
Participants failed to respond on 2.1% of the test tri-
als, and a few additional trials were excluded as before
(0.32% of test trials).
4.2.1 Relationship between actual price and judged
price
The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the mean judgment
for each product against the item’s true price. As in Ex-
periment 2A, we used raw prices and judgments in all
analyses. For every participant there was a significant
positive relationship between judged price and true price.
As in previous experiments, the line relating judgment to
true price is swivelled towards the horizontal.
To examine whether the provision of feedback im-
proved the accuracy of judgments, we calculated root
mean squared error (RMSE) for each participant in Ex-
periments 2A and 2B. For Experiment 2A, the mean
RMSE was 30.02 (SD = 9.11); for Experiment 2B, the
mean RMSE was 21.53 (SD = 3.28). We conducted
a 2x2 between subjects ANOVA with condition (Feed-
back vs. No feedback) and gender (Male vs. Female)
as factors. The results indicated a significant effect of
condition: the provision of feedback improved accuracy
(F (1, 52) = 22.2, p < .001,η2p = .299). However, there
was no main effect of gender (F (1, 52) = 3.0, p = .088,
η2p = .055) and no interaction (F (1, 52) < 1).
4.2.2 Sequential Effects
We examined sequential effects in the same way as be-
fore. The coefficients for each participant are shown in
Table 4. For all 28 participants there is a significant posi-
tive relationship between true price and judged price. For
the Pn−1 term, 17 participants have a positive coefficient
(6 of which are significant) and 11 have a negative co-
efficient (2 significant). For the Jn−1 term, 14 show a
positive relationship (5 significant) and 14 show a nega-
tive relationship (none significant).
One-sample t-tests confirm the pattern suggested by in-
spection of the individual coefficients. There is a signifi-
cant positive effect of true price, t(27) = 27.6, p < .001,
a significant positive effect of Pn−1, t(27) = 2.27, p =
.031, and no effect of Jn−1, t(27) = 1.84, p = .077. In-
clusion of trial number as a predictor made no difference
to this pattern.
The second order effects are shown in Figure 3. There
is some indication of an inverted v-shape, but the effect of
jump size is not signficant (F (4, 108) = 1.10, p = .360,
η2p = .039).
Inclusion of Pn−2 and Jn−2 as predictors in the re-
gression equation indicated no consistent effect of the
events from two trials back in the sequence. (One par-
ticipant showed a significant positive Pn−2 coefficient;
one showed a significant negative Jn−2 coefficient; one
sample t-tests on the mean coefficients showed no effect
of either Pn−2, M = 0.014, SD = 0.086, t(27) < 1 or
Jn−2, M = −0.001, SD = 0.144, t(27) < 1.)
Independent samples t-tests indicated no effect of gen-
der on any of the coefficients (for the intercept, t(26) =
1.06, p = .300; for the Pn predictor, t(26) = 1.40,
p = .172; for Pn−1, t(26) < 1; for Jn−1, t(26) = 1.08,
p = .289).
Comparison of the R2 changes listed in Table 2 shows
that feedback increased the dependence on Pn−1 and re-
duced the dependence on Jn−1. However, feedback did
not appreciably diminish the total effect of the events
from the previous trial.
In short, the provision of feedback shifts the effect of
the preceding stimulus from contrast to assimilation and
reduces the effect of the preceding judgment.
4.2.3 Effect of feedback on sequential effects
In order to compare the feedback and no-feedback condi-
tions directly, and to see whether the feedback manipula-
tion interacted with gender, we conducted a series of 2x2
between-subjects ANOVAs with condition (Feedback vs.
No feedback) and gender (Male vs. Female) as factors.
We conducted a separate ANOVA for each of the predic-
tors in the regression model, using the regression coeffi-
cients as the dependent variables.
For the intercept, there was no effect of condition,
F (1, 52) < 1, but a significant effect of gender,
F (1, 52) = 4.1, p = .049, η2p = .072, with the inter-
cept for male participants (M = 14.83, SD = 13.09)
larger than that for females (M = 9.40, SD = 5.58).
There was no interaction between condition and gender,
F (1, 52) = 1.27, p = .265, η2p = .024.
For the true price Pn, there was a significant effect of
condition, F (1, 52) = 24.3, p < .001, η2p = .319; as
can be seen by comparison of Tables 3 and 4, the mean
coefficient became larger in the Feedback condition. As
described above, the relationship between judged price
and true price was too shallow in both conditions. The
finding that feedback rendered the slope steeper is there-
fore consistent with the results of the RMSE analysis
which showed that feedback improved the accuracy of
judgments. The relationship between true price and judg-
ment was not influenced by gender, F (1, 52) = 2.89,
p = .095, η2p = .053, and there was no interaction be-
tween condition and gender, F (1, 52) < 1.
The effect of the preceding item’s true price, Pn−1,
was significantly influenced by the provision of feedback,
F (1, 52) = 11.2, p = .002, η2p = .177. As indi-
cated above, feedback shifted the effects of the preced-
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Table 4: Regression coefficients for Experiment 2B (Feedback provided).
Unstandardized Standardized
Participant int Pn Pn−1 Jn−1 Pn Pn−1 Jn−1 R2
1 10.379 0.689a 0.159 −0.078 0.670 0.155 −0.079 0.470
2 16.262d 0.421a 0.219d 0.053 0.462 0.239 0.052 0.325
3 11.218d 0.480a 0.103 −0.036 0.730 0.153 −0.038 0.541
4 15.292d 0.668a −0.043 −0.025 0.696 −0.043 −0.025 0.484
5 12.187d 0.662a 0.104 −0.086 0.793 0.125 −0.088 0.616
6 28.676a 0.393a 0.135 −0.166 0.474 0.163 −0.166 0.260
7 5.451 0.571a 0.140 0.137 0.754 0.186 0.137 0.616
8 8.439 0.719a 0.121 0.079 0.738 0.126 0.079 0.606
9 13.862d 0.611a −0.226d 0.311c 0.699 −0.256 0.306 0.567
10 12.766 0.304a 0.216c 0.149 0.437 0.323 0.147 0.305
11 5.278 0.704a −0.083 0.232c 0.690 −0.080 0.261 0.510
12 16.359c 0.520a 0.105 −0.010 0.701 0.142 −0.010 0.506
13 11.515 0.696a −0.126 0.215d 0.695 −0.125 0.220 0.519
14 8.577 0.554a −0.086 0.242d 0.743 −0.118 0.245 0.545
15 8.067 0.458a 0.022 0.232d 0.536 0.025 0.225 0.337
16 7.937 0.719a 0.084 −0.041 0.782 0.094 −0.041 0.621
17 8.762 0.768a 0.200d −0.146 0.801 0.226 −0.150 0.666
18 11.983d 0.591a 0.217d −0.035 0.702 0.250 −0.035 0.549
19 8.452 0.665a 0.060 −0.002 0.782 0.071 −0.002 0.614
20 6.642 0.613a −0.008 0.092 0.794 −0.011 0.091 0.629
21 12.784d 0.655a −0.033 −0.063 0.758 −0.039 −0.064 0.586
22 19.085c 0.568a −0.053 0.052 0.640 −0.060 0.052 0.405
23 2.070 0.502a 0.214c 0.112 0.621 0.270 0.111 0.560
24 10.955d 0.570a −0.041 0.196 0.763 −0.054 0.196 0.614
25 18.022b 0.710a −0.023 −0.012 0.810 −0.026 −0.013 0.649
26 21.302a 0.698a −0.191d 0.091 0.769 −0.208 0.091 0.583
27 7.174 0.731a 0.136 −0.057 0.692 0.131 −0.059 0.514
28 −0.483 0.585a 0.299a −0.154 0.750 0.381 −0.154 0.600
1ex M 11.393 0.601a 0.058 0.046 0.696 0.073 0.046 0.528
SD 6.000 0.115a 0.135 0.132 0.103 0.160 0.134 0.110
a p <.0001, b p < .001, c p < .01, d p < .05
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ing price from a negative dependency (contrast) to a pos-
itive one (assimilation). There was no effect of gender,
F (1, 52) = 1.01, p = .320, η2p = .019, and no interac-
tion, F (1, 52) < 1.
Finally, the effect of the preceding judgment was
significantly influenced by the provision of feedback,
F (1, 52) = 10.7, p = .002, η2p = .171; the large as-
similation to Jn−1 found in Experiments 1 and 2A is es-
sentially eliminated by the provision of feedback. There
was no effect of gender, F (1, 52) = 1.26, p = .266,
η2p = .024, and no interaction, F (1, 52) < 1.
5 General discussion
In three experiments we have found sequential depen-
dencies in judgments of price which match those seen
in psychophysical tasks. In Experiment 1 and Experi-
ment 2A, the judged price of the current item assimilated
towards the judgment made about the previous item but
contrasted away from the true price of that item. This
parallels the finding in studies of magnitude estimation,
cross-modality matching, category judgment and abso-
lute identification (e.g., Jesteadt et al., 1977; Matthews &
Stewart, in press; Mori, 1998; Mori & Ward, 1995; Pet-
zold & Haubensak, 2001; Ward, 1987). In Experiment
2B, we found that telling people the true price of each
item after they entered their judgment improved accuracy
and changed the pattern of sequential dependencies; con-
trast to the preceding item’s true price was replaced by
assimilation, and the assimilation to the preceding judg-
ment largely disappeared. These findings have a num-
ber of implications for our understanding of how peo-
ple make a series of judgments, which we now discuss
in turn.
5.1 The effect of the previous judgment
In the absence of feedback, the current judgment assimi-
lates towards the previous one. There are several possible
interpretations of this result; some have suggested that
when the participant is unsure of her judgment she sim-
ply repeats the previous response (e.g., Garner, 1953; see
also Treisman & Williams, 1984). However, studies of
perceptual identification suggest that there is genuine as-
similation rather than mere repetition (e.g., Stewart et al.,
2005), and a number of psychophysicists have interpreted
response assimilation as indicating that the previous item
is used as a point of reference for the current judgment.
That is, rather than evaluating each item with respect to
a long-term set of referents or a fixed internal scale, each
judgment proceeds at least partly by comparison with the
previous item.
Exactly how this works is a topic of debate (e.g., De-
Carlo & Cross, 1990; Laming, 1984; Stewart et al.,
2005), but Laming (1995) provides a concise statement
of the general principal in a discussion of cervical smear
tests: “Suppose now that one smear, call it Sn, is diag-
nosed as positive. The next smear, Sn+1, is compared
with Sn and, if it is judged to be more abnormal than
Sn or about the same, is also diagnosed as positive. This
means that the mere fact of Sn being called ‘positive’ in-
creases the likelihood that Sn+1 will be classified ‘pos-
itive’ too” (Laming, 1995, p. 513). Laming’s article is
a (non-experimental) attempt to make sense of the fail-
ure of a professional cytologist to identify a large number
of cancerous cervical smears. The response assimilation
seen in our data (when feedback is absent) suggests that
a similar use of local context applies when people make
judgments of price, and bolsters the idea that this is a gen-
eral principal of human judgment not restricted to situa-
tions involving highly confusable, unidimensional stim-
uli.
5.2 The effect of the previous stimulus
In Experiments 1 and 2A, where feedback was absent,
we found weak contrast to the true price of the previous
item. A similar finding has been reported in studies of
magnitude estimation (e.g., Jesteadt et al., 1977) and per-
ceptual identification (e.g., Mori & Ward, 1995). The role
of the previous stimulus in shaping psychophysical judg-
ments has been given a number of interpretations. No-
tably, several of these explanations seem to be restricted
to judgments of single physical aspects of unidimensional
stimuli (e.g., Brown et al., 2008). For example, Ward
(1979) argues that the central nervous system forms an in-
ternal representation of the stimulus and that “because of
the excitatory-center inhibitory-surround nature of such
neural representations . . . the center of the internal repre-
sentation of the stimulus on Trial n is moved away from
(contrasted with) its centre on Trial n − 1” (Ward, 1979,
p. 446).
Such accounts are difficult to adapt to judgment situ-
ations where the to-be-judged items are complex multi-
dimensional objects and the judgment dimension is not a
simple physical property. Alternative explanations for the
effects of the preceding stimulus, which assume confu-
sion of successive items in memory, seem more applica-
ble to the current scenario (e.g., Lockhead & King, 1983).
Such memory-based accounts have implications for the
effects of manipulating the time between successive items
and can be tested by manipulating the inter-judgment in-
terval (DeCarlo, 1992; Matthews & Stewart, in press).
Although on average participants in Experiments 1 and
2A showed contrast to Pn−1, some individuals showed
weak assimilation. We believe this is most likely due to
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noise. However, Beckstead (2008) has noted that when
participants make judgments of multi-dimensional stim-
uli, some dimensions produce contrast and some pro-
duce assimilation. The heterogeneity of Pn−1 coeffi-
cients might imply that participants are primarily bas-
ing their decisions on a dimension which elicits contrast
whilst others focus on a dimension which elicits assimi-
lation.
5.3 The effects of providing feedback
In Experiment 2B, telling participants the true price of
each item after they entered their judgment substantially
altered their performance. As would be expected from
psychophysical studies, the provision of feedback im-
proved accuracy (e.g., Ward & Lockhead, 1971). In addi-
tion, feedback largely eliminated the assimilation to Jn−1
and shifted the effects of Pn−1 from weak contrast to
weak assimilation. These results are consistent with the
idea that participants use the previous judgment as a point
of reference. In the absence of feedback, the judgment
process is presumably something like: “This item looks
like it costs a bit more than the last one. I said the last one
would cost £100, so I’ll say this one costs £120.” When
feedback is provided, the decision is likely to be made
with reference to that information: “This one looks a bit
more expensive than the last, and I was told that that one
cost £100 . . . ”
Although Experiment 2B indicated assimilation to the
true price of the preceding item, the mean coefficient was
relatively small when compared to that for Jn−1 in Exper-
iments 1 and 2A. This is presumably because the percep-
tual or mnemonic effects responsible for contrast to Pn
were still present, such that the net influence of Pn−1 was
a combination of weak contrast (of the type seen in Ex-
periments 1 and 2A) driven by some perceptual or mem-
ory factor, and strong assimilation, driven by comparative
judgment. It is also noticeable in Table 2 that the provi-
sion of feedback did not reduce the overall effect of the
local context (cf. Mori & Ward, 1995).
Although feedback reduced the net effect of Jn−1, sev-
eral participants still show significant response assimila-
tion, perhaps because of a tendency to repeat the most
recent judgment. The heterogeneity of regression coef-
ficients in Experiment 2B may indicate that the effects
of feedback differ from participant to participant. More
generally, individuals may differ in the judgment strate-
gies they adopt and the sequential effects that result.
5.4 The effects of expertise and amount of
information
Our attempt to investigate the effects of expertise in Ex-
periments 2A and 2B yielded little. This was almost cer-
tainly due to a failure of the manipulation; we had con-
jectured that female participants would know more about
women’s shoes than male participants would. In post-
experimental debriefing we asked the participants if they
had ever been to a Topshop store or visited the Topshop
website. All 28 female participants reported having vis-
ited the store or website; however, 18 of the male partic-
ipants reported having been, too (10 in Experiment 2A,
8 in Experiment 2B; note that Topshop exclusively sells
women’s clothing). Thus, although the female partici-
pants in our experiments were probably more knowledge-
able about the items being judged than were the males,
the difference was relatively small.
In general we would expect expertise and information
about the items presented for judgment to influence se-
quential dependencies. In magnitude estimation experi-
ments, decreasing stimulus information (for example by
presenting the stimuli for less time) increases the depen-
dence on the previous response (Ward, 1979). However,
this effect depends upon whether or not feedback is pro-
vided. In absolute identification tasks with feedback pro-
vided, decreasing stimulus information decreases depen-
dency on the preceding response but increases the de-
pendency on the previous stimulus (see e.g., Lockhead,
1984). One can envisage that, when the task is diffi-
cult, the participant uses the events from the previous trial
when making her judgment. If she is provided with feed-
back, she elects to use this information, rather than her
own uncertain judgment, as the point of reference. These
effects of feedback and uncertainty will be important in
reducing sequential biases in real-world applications.
5.5 Choice of regression equation and
depth of the effects
We used Equation 1 to assess local context effects be-
cause it has been widely used in psychophysical re-
search and because it provides readily-interpretable re-
sults. There are, of course, other ways to test for se-
quential dependencies. For example, Beckstead (2008)
has recently applied time-series analysis to expert med-
ical judgments with multiple predictor cues. Such anal-
yses hold great promise; however, the simple regression
analysis employed here has the advantage that it allows
direct comparison with previous work in psychophysical
studies, providing a theoretical framework for interpret-
ing the results and a testable set of predictions regarding
the effects of experimental manipulations such as the pro-
vision of feedback or changes in stimulus information.
DeCarlo and Cross (1990; DeCarlo, 1992) have sug-
gested replacing the Jn−1 predictor in Equation 1 with
an autocorrelated error term, such that it is the error in
judgment, rather than raw responses, which are correlated
over successive trials. In magnitude estimation studies,
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the results of this analysis are usually similar to those
obtained with Equation 1 with the exception that con-
trast to the preceding stimulus is replaced by assimila-
tion, which has implications for the precise interpretation
of the perceptual/mnemonic component of the sequential
dependencies. However, the finding that successive re-
sponses are correlated because the previous trial provides
a point of reference for the current judgment is retained
in DeCarlo and Cross’s (1990) analysis.
We found no evidence for effects of stimuli or re-
sponses from two trials previously, (although we should
be cautious about accepting this null result). Psychophys-
ical studies have similarly found that in magnitude es-
timation tasks — where, as in the current experiments,
the participant is free to give any number she likes as
a response — only the immediately preceding trial in-
fluences judgment (e.g., Jesteadt et al., 1977; Petzold &
Haubensak, 2001), whereas in categorization and iden-
tification tasks — where the response set is constrained
— the effects extend for two or more trials (Petzold &
Haubensak, 2001; Staddon, King, & Lockhead, 1980).
Petzold and Haubensak (2001) have suggested that this
difference occurs because magnitude estimation involves
comparing the stimulus with a single referent (the previ-
ous item), whereas category judgment involves gauging
the position of the stimulus in a subjective range defined
by two endpoints. These ideas could be tested by replac-
ing the price judgment task used in our experiments with
a price categorization task and seeing whether deeper se-
quential effects emerge.
5.6 Second order effects
We found some evidence that the correlation between
successive responses was greater when successive stim-
uli were closer together, particularly in Experiment 2A
(see Figure 3), although the small number of trials and
binning of different jump sizes mean that this result must
be treated with caution. In psychophysics, this result has
been given a number of interpretations (e.g., Ward, 1979).
In particular, Laming (1984) has taken it as evidence that
participants judge each stimulus with respect to the last,
but that their judgment of stimulus differences is very im-
precise, to the point that judgments are little better than
ordinal. That is, participants rate each stimulus as “a lot
less,” “a little less,” “about the same,” “a bit more” or “a
lot more” than the previous item.
5.7 The central tendency of judgment
In all three experiments, we found that the regression
lines relating participants’ judgments to the true prices
were swivelled towards the horizontal: Judgments were
pulled towards the centre of the range, with an overesti-
mation of cheap products and an underestimation of ex-
pensive ones. If this reflects a genuine central tendency
of judgment (rather than just regression to the mean) then
the standard deviation of the responses for each partici-
pant will be less than the standard deviation of the true
prices. (We are grateful to Jonathan Baron for this sug-
gestion.) For Experiment 1, the SD of the (log) judg-
ments was smaller than SD of the (log) prices for all 25
participants (for judgments, M = 0.714, SD = 0.141;
for true prices, M = 0.975, SD = 0.002; note that
the small number of excluded trials explains why there
is some slight between-participant variation in the stan-
dard deviation of the true prices.) A paired-samples t-test
indicated that the difference is significant, t(24) = 9.26,
p < .001. Similarly, in Experiment 2A the SD for (un-
transformed) judgments was smaller than that for (un-
transformed) prices for 25 of the 28 participants (for
judgments, M = 19.85, SD = 7.82; for true prices,
M = 27.24, SD = 0.44, t(27) = 4.99, p < .001). In
Experiment 2B, the same pattern was found (24 of the
28 participants had smaller judgment SD (M = 23.66,
SD = 3.21) than true price SD (M = 27.19, SD =
0.54;t(27) = 5.80, p < .001). As one would expect from
the foregoing discussion of feedback effects, the differ-
ence between the judgment SD and price SD was greater
in the absence of feedback (M = 7.39, SD = 7.84) than
when feedback was provided (M = 3.53, SD = 3.22;
t(27) = 2.41, p = .021).
This central tendency of judgment has long been rec-
ognized by psychophysicists (e.g., Hollingworth, 1909);
in studies of magnitude estimation, it is referred to as
the “regression effect” (e.g., Reynolds & Stevens, 1960;
Stevens & Guirao, 1962). Laming (2004) has argued that
this kind of bias is common in real-world judgments, and
Garner (1953) has raised the possibility that this central
tendency is itself a consequence of sequential effects. The
central tendency can also be thought of as a rational strat-
egy: If a person is completely uncertain, it makes sense to
guess the average value; in a state of partial uncertainty, it
may be sensible to bias one’s judgment towards the mean.
Establishing the validity of these ideas in the current
context by systematically manipulating the range of items
presented for judgment would be a useful direction for
future work.
5.8 Relationship to anchoring
We have argued that participants use the local context as a
frame of reference and have related our findings to those
from psychophysical research. However, the current re-
sults also connect to a quite different body of research,
namely that concerned with anchoring. Anchoring oc-
curs when people’s judgments are biased towards some
extraneous value. In some situations the anchor is self-
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generated, in which case people proceed by a process of
“anchor and adjustment” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
For example, when asked the year in which George Wash-
ington was elected president, most people begin by think-
ing of the year of independence and then adjusting away
from that value (Epley & Gilovich, 2001). In other situa-
tions the anchor is provided by the experimenter. For ex-
ample, Tversky & Kahneman (1974) asked participants to
judge whether the percentage of African countries in the
United Nations (UN) is higher or lower than some value
(the anchor). Subsequent estimates of the percentage of
African countries in the UN were biased towards the an-
chor. Such experimenter-provided anchors seem to in-
fluence judgment by activating anchor-consistent knowl-
edge (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999), and influence judg-
ments even when the anchor is not relevant to the task
(Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996) or is sublimi-
nally presented (Mussweiler & Englich, 2005).
There is a formal similarity between anchoring and the
sequential effects found in both the current experiments
and in psychophysical investigations. On each trial of
a magnitude estimation experiment, the participant has
recently encountered a number (their own previous re-
sponse) which may serve as an anchor for the current re-
sponse. When feedback is provided the most recently en-
countered number will be the feedback from the previous
trial, which may again serve as an anchor and mask the
anchoring on the previous judgment. Moreover, the an-
choring effect depends upon the participant’s knowledge
of the topic about which they are asked (Wilson et al.,
1996) in much the same way that increasing information
about a stimulus reduces the magnitude of sequential ef-
fects (Ward, 1979).
The idea that anchoring and sequential dependencies
share common mechanisms leads to novel empirical di-
rections. For example, self-generated anchors produce
greater effects when the participant is engaged in accep-
tance behaviour (head nodding) than rejection behaviour
(head shaking), presumably because head shaking de-
creases the chance that a given adjustment from the an-
chor will be accepted as the correct answer (Epley &
Gilovich, 2001). If sequential dependencies arise because
the previous response serves as a self-generated anchor
then the head nodding/shaking manipulation ought to in-
fluence the magnitude of response assimilation. Clearly,
this effect is not overtly predicted by psychophysical ac-
counts of sequential dependencies.
5.9 Conclusions
The immediate context affects judgments of price in
much the same way as it affects judgments of loudness
or brightness, and it seems likely that in both cases par-
ticipants partially use the most recent item as a point of
reference for the current judgment. The magnitude and
form of this dependency can be reduced by the provi-
sion of feedback and, most likely, by expertise (although
the latter effect was not found here). These results have
implications for our understanding of judgment in both
real-world and psychophysical settings. They are also of
practical importance because biases introduced by local
context necessarily impair judgment accuracy. Finally,
they suggest connections between hitherto entirely sepa-
rate domains: sequential effects in psychophysical exper-
iments and anchoring in decision-making research.
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